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ABSTRACT 
Paradoxes are historically embedded in institutions and organizations. Latent paradoxes pose 
danger if they become salient; sociological analyses can identify historically embedded latent 
paradoxes. The emergency management paradox, in which the state invests vast resources, 
establishing formidable organizational arrangements that rely on knowledge to respond to 
unanticipated events in advance of their occurrence, even though such events can only ever 
be known after they occur, is a paradox of this kind. Deploying methodological ‘dual 
integrity’ we trace through historical description and sociological conceptualization the institutional 
and organizational history of the emergency management paradox in Australia, where uncontrollable 
bushfires are becoming increasingly common, before drawing more general conclusions about how a 
response to grand challenges, such as climate change, 
demands an interdisciplinary understanding of the rituals and realities of paradoxes that 
emerge historically from our collective attempts to handle uncertainty via risk. Our research serves as 
a warning of the grave consequences that can result from ignoring a paradox’s 
history, whether intentionally or unwittingly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Paradoxical tensions in organizational systems “may remain latent—dormant, unperceived, 
or ignored—until environmental factors or cognitive efforts” make them salient (Smith & 
Lewis, 2011, p. 390). While recent research has underscored the ontology of paradoxes 
(Hahn & Knight, 2019; Schad & Bansal, 2018) in preference to empirical cases, we turn to 
empirical history and concepts that refer to empirical problems. In case of crises such as the 
2020 COVID-19 pandemic, tensions unfolded because sources of insecurity arose not 
encompassed by the scale and scope of existing risk knowledge practices or routines. 
Political sociologists refer to this condition as a “security paradox”, arising from multiple and 
conflicting logics (Kessler & Daase, 2008), many of which pre-date the rise of risk 
management (as described by Power, 2007). Our aim is to understand an empirical case in 
which this security paradox became not only latent but also invisible, from the point of view 
of risk. 
To do this, we rely on the following structure. First, we summarize what we refer to as the 
emergency management paradox, that arises through the state investing vast resources and 
establishing formidable organizational arrangements that rely on knowledge to respond to 
unanticipated events in advance of their occurrence, even though such events can only ever 
be known after they occur. Second, we draw on methodological resources from historical 
organization studies to develop our work (Maclean, Harvey, & Clegg, 2016). Finally, we 
discuss the relationship between uncertainty and organizational paradox and the role of 
rituals in this relationship as well as how a paradox focus can inform understanding of 
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governmental shifts in the organization of security. Identifying a tension between 
anthropological recourse to ritual to ward off uncertainty and the realities of emergency 
management, we conclude with a comment on the consequences of our research for the 
ongoing fight to protect populations from COVID-19 as well as the equally urgent need to 
respond to climate change. Through a historical-empirical description of how risk thinking in 
particular is dangerously ignorant about the emergency management paradox, we are able to 
conclude that the historical embeddedness of organizational paradoxes renders them latent 
and invisible in the present. The task of the sociological imagination is to make the processes 
of latency available for scrutiny and reform. 
THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PARADOX 
Regulating, ordering, limiting and bounding uncertainty has been a canonical concern 
throughout organization studies’ history of ideas (Clegg, 2010). How organizational scholars 
relate to uncertainty has relatively recently become refracted through different disciplinary 
understandings of risk, including organizational scholarship (Hardy et al., 2020) that 
understands risk, how risk objects are socially constructed and how they are organized (e.g. 
Hardy & Maguire, 2016, 2020; Maguire & Hardy, 2013). Important risk-related paradoxes 
emerge from tensions between the present and the histories from which risk management 
emerged. To study this tension between the past and the present, we focus on the institutions 
and organizations that are tasked with managing and organizing emergencies that result from 
unknowable and unpredictable events. In the face of such events we ask how does 
organizational action designed to cope with these ‘unknown unknowns’ become paradoxical?  
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To make sense of this paradoxicality in an intelligible way, we describe how governmental 
apparatuses for managing risk take shape (e.g. Collier & Lakoff, 2008, 2015; Deville & 
Guggenheim, 2018; Deville, Guggenheim, & Hrdličková, 2014). Agencies collectively 
known as emergency management organizations, for example FEMA and all of its arms in 
the United States or, in the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms, commonly 
known as ‘COBRA’ and the range of ‘blue light services’, are government institutions 
responsible for managing catastrophic risks for people and property. Emergency management 
presumes the capacity to anticipate and act on events whose occurrence is unpredictable 
because it is based on knowledge about occurrences that cannot exist; thus, emergency 
management prefigures events whose scope cannot be known accurately a priori. The events 
being prepared for cannot, ex vi termini, be anticipated in where and when and with what 
consequences they will occur. Hence, an initial question is why invest in managing 
something that is by definition unknowable?  
To deal with this conjuncture of possibilities, contemporary emergency managers use a four-
stage structure of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, allowing them to partition 
work into what needs to be done before, during and after an emergency. During the response 
phase, attending to events that evade extant meaning (Cunha, Clegg, & Kamoche, 2006), an 
especially consequential paradox occurs: the “emergency management paradox”. To 
understand the contemporary emergency management paradox, we analyse the historical 
conditions under which emergency management organizations developed. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
From a historical perspective, methodological integrity demands command of data and 
sources, often to an extent seemingly more elaborated than the typical organization studies 
case study.i From the organization studies perspective methodological integrity requires that 
historical narration becomes theoretically conceptualized. Elaborating historical conditions in 
concert with conceptualization prepares the twin foundations for “dual integrity” (Clegg et 
al., 2021; Maclean, et al., 2016). Methodological dual integrity entails doing both (Maclean et 
al, 2016) in which deep immersion in historical data, requiring skill in a narrative approach, 
combines with a degree of conceptualization alien to many historians; thus, dual integrity 
employs historical data about institutions and organizations and combines this with 
sociological conceptualization, in this case of analyses of risk and security (Clegg, et al., 
2021). For the former we construct a historical narrative, for the latter we draw most notably 
on concepts from the social study of risk and uncertainty to discuss emergency management 
organizations (esp. Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Dean, 2010). We connect the historical and 
the conceptual using the key notion of paradox. 
The unfolding of paradoxes historically sees them as based on layers of previous decisions 
and structures. Understanding the tensions generated as a consequence of history allows us to 
consider, comparatively, both the origins of paradoxes and a reflexive understanding of the 
limits of paradox theory. As Smith et al. (2019, p. 4) have noted, there are “paradoxes of 
paradox” that can be described as “contradictory, yet interdependent perspectives on paradox 
enveloped in the core theoretical assumptions”. We explain how practices, developed and 
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institutionalized over long periods of time, can render organizational paradoxes latent. The 
insights afforded from studying paradoxes historically can hardly be overstated; sociologists 
of organization need to consider the disastrous consequences for practice of conceptually 
ignoring the invisible tensions that we will describe between past-present, visible-invisible, 
unexpectedness-preparedness.  
Emergency management organizations operate in life-or-death extreme contexts and in so 
doing “provide a unique platform for the study of hard-to-get-at organizational phenomena” 
(Hällgren, Rouleau, & de Rond, 2018, p. 112). Before, during and after a disaster, emergency 
management organizations are responsible for addressing the full range of organizational 
surprises (Cunha, et al., 2006). These organizations have changed not only across their 
lifespan but also through prior events that shaped the reasoning that justified their 
establishment in the first instance. By definition, emergency management organizations are 
designed to plan for the unexpected, giving rise to nested and embedded paradoxes (Schad & 
Bansal, 2018).  
Emergency management organizations, designed to deal with risk and uncertainty, all have 
unique histories even when developing similar organizational tools and instruments. Among 
these are risk devices (e.g. Callon, Millo, & Muniesa, 2007), risk practices (e.g. Power, 
2007), risk routines (e.g. Power, 2016), risk technologies (e.g. Perrow, 1984), the social 
construction and translation of risk objects (e.g. Hardy & Maguire, 2020; Hilgartner, 1992), 
risk communications (e.g. van Loon, 2014), riskwork (Power, 2016), etc. The constellation of 
organizational risk instruments strive to encompass past learning while envisaging a future of 
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risk essentially unknowable as to how, where, why and when what will occur (Foucault, 
1986). Traces of the past in its present accounting are oriented towards future unknowable 
risks, a temporal mangling, generating paradoxes. Understanding risk-related paradoxes 
requires a different starting point from prima facie conceptions for analysis of risk. 
Institutional and organizational histories frame the limits of experience and imagination in 
managing risk. The limits of imagination in our case are framed by Australian history. 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT’S HISTORICAL EMBEDEDNESS  
The military and civil defence origins of Australian emergency management 
Australian emergency management organizations emerged in the early twentieth century, 
drawing on early foundations established in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
across the British Empire.  Emergency management, not being constitutionally legislated 
elsewhere, is a reserve power of the Australian Commonwealth government. Emergencies 
that result from unexpected enemy attack, bushfires, flooded rivers or a pandemic do not 
respect constitutional boundaries. The ad hoc occurrence of disasters often requires the 
Australian government to modify arrangements between federal, state and local 
responsibilities to manage specific emergencies, prompting legislative changes. States and 
territories hold responsibility for organizing local responses to emergencies although, in the 
context of emergency management, the structural relationship between federal and state 
governments was constantly changing, as Australia experimented with different ways of 
adopting policy models from the metropole.  
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Civil defence directorates were first created at the State and Territory level in the late 1930s. 
At this time the importance of being able to cope with “all emergencies” was signalled; 
however, given the backdrop of world wars, attention was directed almost exclusively toward 
preparation for air raids. At the outbreak of the Second World War, Australia established air 
raid precautions adopting the model of the British Civil Defence Act of 1939. Wardens were 
appointed across the country, adopting British handbooks, pamphlets and memoranda. Many 
of the air raid wardens were men of military experience but too old to be sent to war. Most 
Australian defence preparations structurally dovetailed with those of Great Britain, reflecting 
its dominion status (e.g. Wigley, 1977). Defence agendas in the Empire were set at Imperial 
Conferences during full plenary sessions on defence and foreign affairs. Imperial 
Conferences provided the opportunity for Dominion defence representatives to interpret and 
meet the requests of the British government (McCarthy, 1971, p. 21). The 1930 Imperial 
Conference pushed for a standard War Book throughout the Commonwealth. Australia 
established a special section of the Department of Defence devoted to this task (Jones, 1995a, 
p. 32). In August 1936 through to September 1938 planning was directed largely toward the 
coordination of state infrastructures during gas attack to protect the major cities’ civil 
population. Responsibilities for coordination were clear while financial responsibility was 
not, an ongoing issue that Hasluck (1952) argues characterizes the Australian case. 
In March 1939 it was decided that responsibility for emergencies would lie with each state, 
with co-ordination remaining at the federal level. A new section of the Department of 
Defence was created to correspond directly with responsible officers from the states. State-
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level civil defence turned out to be more difficult to coordinate than initially imagined. The 
proposal that organization of air raid precautions should cope with any national emergency 
was accepted. For most of 1939, the structure of emergency organizations developed in 
different ways from one place to another.  
On 3 September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced to the Australian people 
that they too had joined Great Britain at war with Germany. At first, Australian Imperial 
Forces and volunteer forces were mobilized and sent abroad to support Britain; aside from 
rising costs and increasing unemployment, the risks of war were not experienced until the 
Japanese bombing of Darwin in February 1942. By the mid-1940s, air raid precautions and 
their military organization had already become institutionalized, despite media 
representations of disorganization (see Vardenga, 1978). Suggestions were made for the 
“[r]e-establishment of skeleton Air Raid Precaution services recruited from civilian 
volunteers” (The Sydney Morning Herald, 1949). Civil defence organizations continued to 
develop roughly along already established military lines.  
A preoccupation for most of the 1950s was noted by Jones (1995a, p. 36) as “a lack of clarity 
in what civil defence plans and programs were required, and a potential for conflict in the 
effective management of civil defence measures”. There was continued uncertainty about 
where the responsibility for civil defence resided after the war ended (see Jones, 1995b). The 
federal government’s primary responsibility was to coordinate and advise the states. The 
responsibility was uncertain enough to be shifted around, for instance from the Civil Defence 
and State Cooperation section to the Department of Home Security. In the early 1950s, civil 
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defence was located in the Department of the Interior, despite differences of opinion between 
the Minister and the Prime Minister about where responsibility should lie (Department of 
Defence, 1983, p. 113).  
In the early 1950s,  professionalization (Meyer & Bromley, 2013) of civil defence education 
occurred as a mechanism for institutionalizing legitimacy for centres for civil defence 
organization in the event of nuclear threat. The Commonwealth Civil Defence School was 
created in 1956 for training personnel from the recently established state-level Civil Defence 
Committees. The government-based Civil Defence School changed names a number of times 
(National Emergency Services College, Australian Counter Disaster College, Institute of 
Emergency Services), eventually becoming the Australian Emergency Management Institute. 
Initially created for “the protection of the civil population from enemy raids, coastal raids, 
atomic attack and biological warfare” (The Age, 1955) it later conducted “a range of  
activities designed to improve Australia's capability to mitigate, manage and recover from 
disasters” (Australian Emergency Management Institute, 2013). The institute relocated to 
Canberra in 2015 where it operated “to build capability through collaboration, innovation and 
education” (EMA-AEMI, 2015). The present-day parent organization is the Australian 
Institute for Disaster Resilience. 
By the middle of the twentieth century emergency management was recognizably an 
institutional field, populated by complex organizations with multiple functions. A common 
professional purpose defined different nations’ emergency management organizations: “to 
ensure the maintenance and well-being of a sovereign society” (Britton, 2006, p. 347). 
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Organizational scripts were rooted in military planning, so emergencies were viewed as 
extensions of “enemy attack” scenarios to be addressed with command and control structures. 
However, as Dynes (1994) argues, military analogies had limitations. If emergency 
management was to be organized more appropriately the military model would need to be 
overcome. The next section shows that the immediate changes proposed and established in 
response to this problem continued to uphold the sovereign goal under which the 
organizations were originally established. 
Organizational response to natural disasters 
A definitive shift in Australian emergency management occurred after a series of severe 
natural disasters between the late 1960s and early 1970s. These came to be known as the 
“disaster years”, when civil defence reoriented from war-related dangers toward threats from 
natural disasters. The Tasmanian Black Tuesday bushfires (7 February 1967), the Brisbane 
flood (January 1974) and Cyclone Tracy (25 December 1974) caused widespread and 
significant damage. While each disaster unfolded in different ways, their impact shaped 
Australian emergency management at all levels. On Black Tuesday, 110 separate fires were 
recorded in the South of Tasmania in which 62 people died, many more were injured and left 
homeless, 1,293 homes were destroyed and over half a million acres of land burned. The 
Tasmanian fires signalled to Australia that the Commonwealth government could not defer 
all responsibility for disaster prevention to the states.  
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The incoming Labor government in 1972 established a new political agenda: “Labor believes 
that the crippling effects of natural disasters like droughts, floods, fires and cyclones must be 
minimized. We shall establish a national disaster organization to handle these crises with 
speed and efficiency” (Whitlam, 1972, p. 20). In 1974, the functions of the Australian Civil 
Defence Directorate were absorbed into a new organization called the Natural Disasters 
Organization (NDO). The NDO was the result of redesigning the Directorate to be 
responsible for natural disasters without sacrificing the capacity to defend against enemy 
attack. The NDO was barely ten months old when Cyclone Tracy struck Darwin with 
devastating effect. The Commonwealth government was formally responsible for providing 
support in a territory rather than a state. In the words of the then Director of Operations and 
Plans “the only sort of models that we had” were “the old civil defence models … based on 
loose concepts that when an event happened, we rushed out and ran it—which of course we 
didn’t” (Jones, 2005, pp. 55-56). Cyclone Tracy was not only a test of these new NDO 
arrangements but a “baptism of fire” (Hodges, 1999, p. 14) marking the conversion of state-
level civil defence bodies to Emergency Services. The states and territories established 
emergency services through various acts that legislated the role of various disaster and civil 
defence organizations based on local volunteerism. 
The Whitlam Labor government (1972-5), expanded the use of Specific Purpose Payments 
(SPPs), raised under section 96 of the Constitution, to grant financial assistance to states as 
needs arose. SPPs shaped how emergency management was financed. After Cyclone Tracy, 
states received assistance to manage emergencies and disasters through SPPs, reflecting a 
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“traditional emergency management approach, which is in the area of response and relief” 
(Dwyer, 2006, p. 44). In 1975, the Australian Red Cross Society created the Red Cross 
Disaster Services Department and the National Disaster Relief Committee, facilitating 
standardization by nationalizing coordination under the banner of preparedness and training. 
The expansion of organizations in relation to disasters characterizes the period that sits 
roughly between Cyclone Tracy in 1974 and the early 2000s. During this period, 
responsibility for different kinds of threats converged as the core tasks of emergency 
management organizations divided in terms of disaster-related responsibilities. 
Emergency management legislation developed from the early 1980s onwards and the range 
of organizations and actors, roles and positions, significantly expanded, as did the role of 
formal knowledge. Professionalization and institutionalization were oriented almost 
exclusively to natural disasters in spite of the convergence of civil defence and natural 
disaster problems under a common umbrella of emergency management. Jones (1995a) 
argued that the civil defence domain was being evacuated by emergency management 
organizations, reducing the number of social positions and tacit knowledge.  
CONTEMPORARY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Economic reform 
Continuing professionalization through education and organization characterizes 
contemporary emergency management. In the mid-1980s the Australian Inter-Service 
Incident Management System (AIIMS) was developed, with the aim of becoming a “robust 
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incident management system that will enable the seamless integration of activities and 
resources of multiple agencies when applied to the resolution of any emergency situation” 
(Australasian Fire Authority Council, 2004, p. i). A management framework establishing 
authorities at different levels and between different levels was created in an attempt to 
centralize control of highly decentralized government arrangements. While states and 
territories were responsible for the protection of people and property, the ultimate locus of 
control for AIIMS was federal.  
For a short period in the late 1980s organizationally centralized control was aided further by 
the establishment of emergency management education located exclusively in universities. 
Collaborations formed between state-level emergency services and universities in the early 
1990s, creating emergency management education programs providing various forms of 
standardized certification, such as the Commonwealth counter disaster concepts and 
principles (Natural Disasters Organisation, 1989). The concepts underpinning this were: (1) 
an “all-hazards” approach; (2) a “comprehensive” approach; (3) an “all-agencies” or 
“integrated” approach and, (4) a “prepared community” approach. Much of this terminology 
came to dominate later efforts to “improve” emergency management. In particular, the 
principles refer to hazard analysis, organization, information and, not least, “command, 
control and co-ordination”. Three institutional and organizational shifts were occurring at the 
time. First, the naming of the EMA reflected its new functions (from response to emergency 
management). Second, significant numbers of military staff were reduced, with EMA 
becoming by 1999 a wholly civilian staffed organization. Third, high level emergency 
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managers began to conceive of the ‘field’ of emergency management. Fourth, a simple 
vertical chain of command was being replaced by a network of interrelated organizations.  
Comprehensive emergency management based on PPPR 
Emergency Management Australia adopted four key principles that aligned with the broader 
impetus to rationalize government along economic lines (Pusey, 1991): a comprehensive 
approach; an all hazards approach; an all agencies approach and a prepared community 
approach. State emergency management organizations began to adopt risk management 
protocols.ii Salter (1997, p. 60) notes a “paradigm shift from extreme events to a focus on 
vulnerability and the management of social impact; from hazard to risk”, in a basic 
architecture adopting a comprehensive approach or Prevention (previously Mitigation), 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery (or PPPR) approach, developed by the United States 
National Governors’ Association (1979). As the U.S. State Governors’ Association model 
was translated to Australian emergency managers through training programs, so too the 
adoption of this model by Australian emergency management was translated for Asian 
countries through various publications (see Carter, 1991), indicating the development of an 
international professional field of shared knowledge.  
Underlying the approach is the familiar plan, do, check, act model (Deming, 2000). Prior 
organizational scripts did not entirely replace subsequent ones but there was a continuation of 
standardization (e.g. the international diffusion of standards) amplified by broader economic 
reforms. Managerialism became “a fundamental leitmotif” for reform by assuming that 
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“efficiency in the public services can be achieved by simulating a business situation, by 
adapting the methods and practices of the private sector to the public services” (Bogdanor, 
2001, p. 291; see also du Gay, 2006). Policy was shifting from “an internal agency focus to a 
community-centred focus – a shift away from delivering a limited range of services (usually 
response based) to more intelligent resource allocation based on risks – business-like 
management and outcome based performance” (Cronstedt, 2002, p. 11). In a risk-driven 
approach the “selection of treatments should be based on criteria founded on efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy” (Cronstedt, 2002, p. 12). The desire was to focus on “the broader 
context of the ongoing everyday life of the community” (Gabriel, 2003, p. 75) wherein risk is 
to be found, rather than taking responsibility for and responding to emergencies, as was 
previously the case. PPPR, rather than assuming responsibility for hazards was premised on 
the responsibility of members of the public taking care of their vulnerabilities. 
The comprehensive approach was enshrined as one of four key principles of Emergency 
Management Australia. The shift of responsibility was from government agencies to 
communities which, together with the priority given to managerial criteria, meant that the 
responsibility of agencies to respond to events and emergencies was not entirely eradicated. 
However, responding to emergencies became mission-subordinated to the identification and 
treatment of risks. According to the Australia/New Zealand Standard ISO 31000:2009, risk is 
“the effect of uncertainty on objectives”. With the shift from responding to hazards to 
managing risk by organizing for security, the conceptual framing constituting the emergency 
management paradox was established as based on managing routines. As we shall argue, 
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routines can become rituals that, when they fail, call forth symbolic and performative figures 
to minimize the grounds that failed. 
DISCUSSION 
The introduction of risk management as an organizational solution to problems happened 
only recently. Historically, organizations in this field were clearly driven by a sovereign task: 
to defend the members of a territorial population and their property against hazard when it 
occurred. Contemporary organizational preparedness routines are guided by modes of 
organizing security. Rehearsing routines became the rationale for organizational existence 
and continuity in the face of imponderable questions of where, when, how and why what 
natural disaster might strike. Different approaches to precaution came to constitute layers in 
the tectonic plates of history.iii The tensions between these layers generate paradoxes between 
practicing routines and responding to hazardous and unknown risks that routines can render 
invisible. In the absence of a catastrophic event the paradox remains hidden (Figure 1). 
----------------- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ----------------- 
Figure 1: The emergency management paradox 
Figure 1 depicts how the emergency management paradox is a consequence of the 
management of risk becoming explicit as modes of organizing security become latent. The 
paradox emerges from the tension between latent sovereignty (defend and protect) and 
explicit rationalism (risk management). The emergency management paradox is invisible 
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from the point of view of risk alone but remains identifiable from an analysis of the history of 
present organizations.  
Our discussion will focus on three things: how we might think about uncertainty, risk and 
security in the study of organizational paradox; the necessary functional yet paradoxical role 
of rituals in resolving the relation of these terms in practice, as well as the contribution that 
studies of organizational paradox can make to understanding security. 
Organizing security in the face of uncertainty in emergency risk management 
An illusion of control was vested in risk management approaches introduced by governments 
in the 1990s. These reforms were initially designed to reduce economic costs. Continued 
investment in emergency management as a way of organizing security was justified by the 
potential of unknowable yet potentially annihilating future events for which states should be 
organizationally prepared. The question of how much or how little government intervention 
this involved was constituted as an under-specified but ongoing political-economic reform or 
“change” project (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012). Generalized risks should be managed and when 
a catastrophic bushfire, pandemic or financial crisis arrived unexpectedly, wreaking harm, 
experts will subsequently dissect it by striving to posit how and why putative control over 
nature, health and prosperity established beforehand did not work as well as strategically 
promoted. Risk management thus evolves in response to a constant cycle of uncertain events 
that paradoxically confound its organized pretensions to knowing.   
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Earlier practices aimed at protecting people and property through sovereign authority rather 
than attempting to manage risk.  Beck (1992) initially argued that late modern societies 
exhibit a tendency toward treating an ever-growing number of unintended consequences of 
modernity as risks, allowing these societies and their members to then develop knowledge 
and technologies to curb or eliminate excesses they created. Faced with the aftermath of a 
post-9/11 world, Beck (2002, p. 41) would later revise this position to argue that in politics, 
law, science, technology, economy and everyday life, there is an unacknowledged tendency 
to “feign control over the uncontrollable”. Beck argues something both paradoxical and 
opaque is happening in the risk society. There is a need to go beyond analysis of the modes 
by which risk is organized (Hardy & Maguire, 2016), to identify what is being expected of 
organizations that are tasked with controlling uncontrollable uncertainty beyond risk 
management.  
Stated positively, the relationship between uncertainty and organizational paradoxes can form 
in multiple epistemological and ontological ways. When organizations and societies are 
conceived as the rational products of modernity, anything that is a potential source of 
uncertainty poses a challenge. Within modernity, uncertainty is conceived as the outer limits 
of rationality. A “demon” against which organization and its theories are directed, uncertainty 
is seen to be a purely epistemological problem (Tsoukas, 2005). Uncertainty, however, will 
always be more than what knowledge can make of it (see: Pierides & Woodman, 2012). 
Since uncertainty means a lack of knowledge in most organizational analyses, this lack is an 
Achille’s heel for modern organizations: events, despite persistent efforts to make things 
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certain through the organization of risk, can always unsettle what is known to be known and 
what is not known to be unknown. From the point of view of rational organization, such 
paradoxes of modernity are a necessary product of modernity itself, to which the project of 
modernity demands a response (Badham, 2019) and organizational paradox studies show the 
many forms that response can take.  
Risk-related paradoxes become apparent only when the lifespan of organizations responsible 
for managing emergencies on behalf of the state is investigated; risk management routines, 
while adaptable, can prove inadequate when confronted by conditions of risk characterized 
by indeterminacy. At the time that risk-related routines are enacted the momentum associated 
with the indeterminacy and position of risk cannot be calculated precisely. Paradoxically, 
routines overwhelm appreciation of the indeterminacy of novel conditions of risk; routines 
lag risks whose conditions of possibility are least appreciated, precisely because the problem 
with the future is that it is yet to happen. 
Risk management is an instrument that emergency managers use to govern on behalf of the 
state. When governing for security or preparing for the unknown it is catastrophic events that 
signal crisis. Therefore, the emergency paradox only becomes visible to organizations when 
things go terribly wrong during “loss of meaning” events.  According to Cunha, et al. (2006) 
loss of meaning events produce wholly unexpected issues and processes. What distinguishes 
them from other surprises is that they are absent from the domain of knowledge. Knowledge 
can only apprehend loss of meaning events after they occur, which gives them the strange 
property of being knowable only in their past. Future such events are unknown. The 
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consequences can be a matter of life and death. These surprises bind unanticipated events 
together with rehearsed routines when they do occur, in which the domain of uncertainty 
claims them as its own; as Knight (1921) argued, this makes surprises unknowable, 
unpredictable and uninsurable. One cannot know when a surprise will occur and it is 
impossible to know what its content will be in advance of its occurrence. Cunha, et al. (2006) 
give the archetypal example of the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers as an instance of this 
kind of event.  
When the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires occurred in the south-eastern part of Australia, 173 
people died as Victorian government agencies struggled to deal with organizational 
arrangements that became untenable. Once the event faded into memory and the 
“retrospective” mode of organizing risk ensued (Hardy, et al., 2020), not all the findings of 
subsequent commissions of inquiry were implemented (cf. Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Dwyer, 
Hardy, & Maguire, in press). As one academic commentator from the ecology and forest 
sciences discipline wrote, “[t]he propensity for inquiries has had the perverse effect of 
making bushfire management less effective and efficient than it should be” (Tolhurst, 2019) 
because such inquiries typically apportion responsibilities rather than accrue learning; 
moreover, many of their recommendations remain unimplemented (Parliament of Victoria, 
2010).     
In organization theory terms, the literature that has attempted to analyse institutional 
incompatibility either assumes that tensions get resolved within logic (e.g. Greenwood, 
Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) or that human actors are 









AUTHOR ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT for publication in Research in the Sociology of Organizations 




Pierides, Clegg & Cunha | Page 22 of 39 
aware of this incompatibility and somehow able to respond to it logically (e.g. Reay & 
Hinings, 2009). At the root of this emphasis on logic is “the modern dream of the 
knowledgeable actor who, freed from the shackles of ignorance, can think for himself/herself 
and can undertake informed, responsible action” (Tsoukas, 1997). Loss of meaning events are 
the most coveted target for control yet, by definition, they are most unknowable, thus 
producing an absurd desire for knowing the unknowable which can make routines 
ridiculously inappropriate.  
Events that are unknowable reside outside the envelope of both institutionalized knowledge 
and intentional planning; as noted by Cunha, et al. (2006), they are similar to what Weick 
(1993) described as cosmology episodes. According to Weick (1993, p. 633), everyday 
assumptions that conceive of the universe as a rational, orderly system can be completely 
disrupted during these episodes, thus demonstrating that cosmological problems “are not just 
the handiwork of philosophers”. The paradoxes that emerge during loss of meaning events 
can be of a cosmological order and what makes these particularly interesting for scholars of 
organization is that they rely on deeply held assumptions that make the cosmos rational; in 
other words, events may potentially confound rational expectations.  
The relationship between uncertainty and organizational paradoxes  
Events, more so catastrophic events, can “visibilize” the invisible (Tuckermann, 2019). The 
2019-2020 summer in Australia started with bushfires in September, before summer had even 
officially started. By late-January, despite substantial rainfall, they had yet to abate. At least 
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33 human lives were directly extinguished (additional deaths were reported from secondary 
effects, such as asthma attacks), along with an estimated one billion non-human lives, over 
three thousand five hundred homes and almost six thousand sheds, barns, and other non-
residential buildings destroyed, across at least one hundred and eighty thousand square 
kilometres of territory, larger than the total size of Greece; species survival was threatened as 
the fire consumes and destroyed habitats, with over a million animals lost and a pall of smoke 
polluting the inhabitants of cities safe from the fires such as Canberra, Melbourne, and 
Sydney. 2019 was the hottest and the driest year on record with Australia the canary in the 
globally warming planet. 
The warming planet’s effects on its most arid continent are making the reality of a warming 
continent highly visible. As the invisible reality of the warming, drying continent becomes 
visible in fires the extent and magnitude of which were unprecedented, emergency 
organizations struggled to bring order to the chaos that ensues. On the part of the current 
federal government, there is climate change denial slowly acceding to a grudging acceptance 
that various strategies from the past, such as hazard reduction, will better plan for the new 
unknown unknowns, despite academic advice to the contrary that it will only intensify fires 
(Lamont & He, 2020). Emissions reduction at the federal level that does not change the 
economic and employment status quo remains government policy. At every stage, 
recalcitrantly, the federal government has sought to position the bushfire issues as a state 
responsibility from which it is federally absolved. The response phase in which this has taken 
place characterizes a growing breach between federal governmentality and the response work 
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that emergency management organizations undertake. The response phase, or what Hardy, et 
al. (2020) refer to as the “real-time” mode of risk organizing, nevertheless remains an 
important and indispensable part of the core responsibilities of emergency management.  
Although global warming is making the incidence of bushfires more likely, it is impossible to 
know the future in advance of its occurrence. In the face of this impossibility an elaborate 
calculative risk management technology developed to posit future possibilities. On the basis 
of these anticipatory outputs organizational decisions ensued. What transpires are standard 
sequences of activities involving organizational gestures and routines, embedded in words 
and material objects, performed according to set sequences. These are characterized by 
formalism, the adoption of standards, rule-governance and anticipatory performance of 
rehearsed routines as talismans against contingent but unknown events. In the day-to-day 
contemporary practices of emergency managers, the grounds of organization have seen the 
prior sovereign goal of protecting the members of a territorial population and their property 
be subordinated to the organizationally routine identification and treatment of risks. Risk 
technologies introduce anticipation as the goal to be achieved, even though it is not 
achievable because the future can never be known. It might seem paradoxical to know how 
an organization can manage to manage what an organization does not know will happen, 
where it does not know it will happen, when it does not know what will happen. What could 
legitimate the performative organization that this ensures?   
Rituals and realities of organizational paradox 
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Organizational legitimation of emergency management services is increasingly premised on a 
risk management framework in which planning for unknown unknowns can be contained. 
The organizational framework is combined with media vesting of key symbolic actors with 
an almost sacred significance when the unknown unknowns transpire, such as volunteer 
firefighters fighting infernos heroically and remorselessly. The warming world ensures that 
escalating risk vests in past organizational routines having a diminishing function, 
momentarily resolved in performances by volunteer fire fighters and emergency managers, as 
symbolic actors. Between performances, the routines are maintained to ward off what will 
always return, when and where one cannot tell. Similar rituals occur in other contexts. In the 
UK, in the face of COVID-19, weekly public applause was collectively organized to honour 
key workers whose media coverage created similar ritual significance. 
Organizations and actors must be seen not just in the immediacy of the risk-dominated 
present moment but also in historical context. Any present environment is made up of the 
effects of previous organizations, shaping social responses to that to which they attend. In 
day-to-day contemporary practices of emergency managers, the prior sovereign goal of 
protecting the security of life and property is now subordinated to focusing on the 
organizational identification and treatment of risks. Risk technologies introduce anticipation 
as the goal to be achieved, even though it is not achievable because the future can never be 
known. The sovereign goal of ensuring security remains a residue in organizational practices.  
The paradoxical condition characteristic of contemporary emergency management 
organizations is that they ward off the unknown through ritual in ways that are strikingly 
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similar to anthropological accounts, for example, of the Azande (Evans-Pritchard, 1937). 
Ritual foregrounds key figures. Any figure, necessarily, then operates against a context or 
ground. The figure grabs our attention while the “ground” supports or contextualizes a 
situation, usually as an area of inattention (Douglas, 2001). Both figure and ground are 
equally important in understanding the full meaning of a situation. That which is perceived 
depends on that which is obscured in order to focus perception (Douglas, 1982). What is 
foregrounded is performing in the theatre of events (Islam, 2016), especially in the most 
prevalent area of Australian risk, that of bushfires. It is there that we find the highly symbolic 
figures, the first responders known in Australian parlance as “fireys”, the volunteer fire 
fighters on the frontline of bushfire responses. The fireys play the key role of being figures 
acting in the face of unknowability. When unknown unknown events, such as bushfires 
occur, the fireys play a symbolic and figurative role in dramatically dealing with the 
uncertainty that ensues, obscuring organization in its current form, its resources and 
rehearsed routines behind these actors.iv The state-based and volunteer basis of the 
emergency services, however, is increasingly inadequate to a world of changed and extreme 
risk and events.v Based on our analysis of the emergency management paradox it would be an 
error to think that sophisticated risk mapping and management technologies and centralized 
state control centres are rituals that, in substance, are any different from those of the fireys.  
The emergency management paradox produces two kinds of ritual to ward off the threat of 
the unknown; one organizational, the other figurative. When the unexpected occurs then there 
are symbolic figures on hand to obscure the paradoxical ground of their organization. First, 
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the routines of professional emergency management organizations that become ritual; second, 
the figurative symbolic role that is played by the frontline firefighting volunteers in 
responding. The frequency of emergencies caused by bushfires is increasing and they are 
happening earlier and more intensely as the climate heats and dries the continent of Australia. 
Organizationally, state-based emergency organizations staffed by volunteers are the legacy 
first responders. These symbolic figures hold a sacred place in the secular rituals of 
emergency fire services under increasing pressure as the length and intensity of the fire 
season expands as the climate heats, dries and burns the terrain.  
We have identified the paradoxical grounds as the state investing vast resources in 
establishing formidable organizational arrangements that rely on knowledge to address 
unknowable events in advance of their occurrence, even though these events can only ever be 
known after they occur. We asked, in the face of unknowable and unpredictable events how 
is organizational legitimation of organizations designed to cope with these “unknown 
unknowns”? Our answer is that legitimation is produced through organizational routines 
whose legitimacy the changing climate is eroding as the intensity, ferocity and frequency of 
bushfires itself intensifies and the routines become less capable of coping with extreme 
events. Increasingly, more global and less local political action is called for, with 
communities becoming gradually more aware of this as Australia burns and federal 
government in Canberra fiddles and fudges facts (Clegg, 2020; Heikkurinen et al., 2019). As 
the world unfolds and new risks emerge, new forms of balance are required.  









AUTHOR ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT for publication in Research in the Sociology of Organizations 




Pierides, Clegg & Cunha | Page 28 of 39 
As we write, the implications are even starker. The emergency management paradox arises 
because governments introduced risk management practices on the back of new public 
management reforms; in so doing they minimized the sovereign mandate of these 
organizations to protect lives. During a major disaster such as the outbreak of COVID-19, 
governments become alert to the fact that this sovereign mandate does not legally or socially 
disappear. The mandate remains limited in its applicability inside the paradox because the 
risk-based logic and its associated practices of risk management kick in when events occur. 
The paradox is then laid bare.  
Differing national responses to COVID-19 underscore the practical significance of 
understanding latent paradoxes before they become salient. In some countries, state and 
government agencies prioritized public health, whereas in other countries leaders’ attention 
was directed more towards economic markers of employment, business activity and the share 
market. The consequence of these different choices was that more citizens from some 
countries focused on the economy have died, relative to others in countries substantively 
focused on public health. The paradox that constitutes differing governmental responses of 
this kind remains latent until a disaster, such as the pandemic, occurs. The emergency 
management paradox saw the initial stress in some countries being “herd immunity” and 
“keeping the economy running” as responses to COVID-19. The significance of such 
paradoxes continues to be tragically and spectacularly on display, as we write, amidst the 
outbreak and unfolding consequences of COVID-19.  
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An initial approach aimed at managing risks via modelling, perforce, could not ignore the 
sovereign goal of protecting the lives of territorial populations at any cost. Initial decisions 
were made on the basis of a risk calculus; it is because of this that multiple governments 
failed to respond adequately to the coronavirus, leading to a global pandemic. Some of these 
governments changed course, buckling under public pressure in the face of mass contagion 
and mortality; others sought refuge from responsibility in confusion. Risk calculations 
contained within them an implicit approach that would “let some vulnerable people die” in 
the interests of a national economy stretched to its limits by prior policies of a minimal state. 
Such an approach should not be acceptable from the point of view of the state’s managers, its 
people or any organization charged with responding. Yet, even after these approaches came 
under public pressure for being unacceptable, government shifted rhetoric to the imperative 
of calculating and mitigating risk through management that balanced individual life and 
health against national wealth. If anything, recourse to routine risk management has 
intensified. The emergency management paradox is being re-embedded by funnelling 
everything through risk and unless attention is drawn to this, it will once again remain latent 
until the next event occurs. 
CONCLUSION 
All ‘organizations are complex structures-in-motion that are best conceptualized as 
historically constituted entities’ (Clegg, 1981, p. 545). Paradoxes are a product of the 
accumulation of historical layers, as if written in a palimpsest in which the past is not buried 
in time but remains active in the shaping of the present (Cunha et al., 2015). We therefore 
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contribute to the debate on interdisciplinary views of paradox by highlighting the relevance 
of historical knowledge and show how to use historical organization studies (Clegg, et al., 
2021; Maclean, et al., 2016), not only to understand the past but also to understand how 
paradoxes are embedded in it. Paradoxes emerge in specific circumstances and to understand 
them, scholars need to scrutinize their historical becoming and show how their past still 
reverberates in their present, expressing the historical embeddedness of paradoxes.  
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i One consequence is that historical narration does not easily admit of brevity; the story must be fully 
documented, as we sought to do in our narrative. 
ii As outlined in the Australia/New Zealand Risk Management Standard AS/NZS 4360, released in 1995 and 
later updated in 1999, 2004 and 2009. 
iii On this point, Mutch (2018, p. 251) makes reference to Osbourne’s (2015) critique of Tomba’s (2013) 
reformulation of Marx in order to think about the concept of institutional logics in a manner that better accounts 
for the time frame of historians. In so doing, he points to Tomba’s use of strata and sedimentation as a 
metaphor. Developing our less metaphorical version of this argument is beyond the scope of our article, 
however we would agree with Mutch that doing so would involve a return to Henri Bergson’s philosophy of 
time. 
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iv In the State of Victoria, a new professional emergency service agency, Fire Rescue Victoria, is about to launch 
and will replace the Metropolitan Fire Brigade. The new agency will be staffed by career firefighters from the 
Country Fire Authority (CFA) and the Melbourne Fire Brigade. It subsumes all professional and volunteer 
stations and staff. Volunteer firefighters have been excluded from government consultations and the CFA chief 
officer, Steve Warrington, has tendered his resignation. Warrington has on previous occasions demonstrated 
reflexive awareness of the limitations of the CFA. This same reflexive awareness does not extend to the 
professionalized emergency management organizations and their staff; unlike volunteer firefighting, risk 
management and its technologies are seen by professional emergency managers and government officials as 
exactly the kind of panacea we have identified as similarly ritualistic. The emergency management paradox is 
invisible from inside a world that is saturated with risk and its calculative knowledge practices. 
 
v In a measure of their significance, a comedian Celeste Barber, established a bushfire fund raiser on Facebook.  
The target was to raise AUD$30,000; it actually raised AUD$51 million which will be distributed by the 
Trustee for NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) and Brigades Donation Fund; thus, this organization, established as a 
state body, is now being funded by donation as well as by the state. 
